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Playing with Molecular Models 
Pierre Laszlo 
Abstract: Any serious study of the uses of molecular models in chemistry has 
to mention play as an essential component. A research chemist will use them 
not unlike a young child playing with a toy: exploring their features, trying out 
their resilience, probing their innards, tinkering, day-dreaming, and thus find-
ing out new avenues of adventures of the mind and in the laboratory. Reasons 
for such an assimilation of a molecular model to a toy are given and assessed 
critically. 
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1. Introduction 
This  article  is  a  companion  piece  to  earlier  publications  co-authored  with 
Roald Hoffmann, dealing with the general topics of representation in chemis-
try,1 with paradigmatic shifts ensuing from the correction of mistaken formu-
lations of chemical compounds,2 and with the role of conversation in science.3 
  To complement the special issues of HYLE dealing with models in chem-
istry with a paper on the playful aspects of model handling is as pleasant as it 
amounts to an internalized obligation, on the part of a practicing professional 
organic chemist. For this paper, I had no better choice than an eclectic meth-
od. I draw on several decades of personal experience with molecular models 
as a professional researcher (methodology of organic synthesis, spectroscopic 
studies of molecular interactions) and as an educator. I shall build my case 
with other components, too, culled from the histories of science, games, and 
pedagogy. There will be also psychological and sociological elements, to be 
handled critically and without undue reliance.4 86  Pierre Laszlo 
2. What is play? 
Playing is an activity (truly, an intricate set of very diverse activities and be-
haviors) associated with children, but which of course also adults are occa-
sionally engaged in, too.5 When performed by young children, a play shows 
components of orienting within an environment; achieving a measure of con-
trol of the objects present; learning to associate e.g. visual and tactile percep-
tions; mimicking or emulating a behavior, typically that of adults in ‘pretend-
ing games’; identifying the self and pitting it against others in social interac-
tions. Most of these factors are also involved, are at play one might say, in the 
handling of molecular models by professional chemists. 
  Johann Huizinga in his justifiably classic book on play and games, Homo 
ludens,6 emphasized the competition aspect. As a rationalist, he espoused the 
ages-old  discrimination  by  contrasting  the  playful  with  the  serious.  Later, 
Roger Caillois7 also put his systematic study of games under the same over-
arching duality. He went on organizing games according to a typology along 
the four basic categories of competition (agôn), chance (alea), altered mental 
states (ilinx), and simulation (mimicry). Clearly, playing with a model for 
representing a chemical compound belongs predominantly to the fourth cat-
egory.  
  Furthermore, many languages (such as French) denote by a word such as 
jeu or the equivalent an imperfect fit in the adjustment of interacting mechan-
ical parts, as in a geared assembly or in a piece of woodwork or carpentry. 
The real mechanical device is distinguished from the idealized fully determin-
istic contraption in the abstract realm of rational mechanics precisely by such 
a measure of freedom, by a degree of behavior unpredictable from the well-
understood laws and rules of mechanics.8 One might say that jeu in any kind 
of  mechanical  devices  serves  as  a  real-life  and  avowedly  anthropomorphic 
metaphor, standing for this playful-serious duality. 
  True, quite a few authors have questioned its very existence. In the philo-
sophical tradition of Nietzsche and Heidegger, Jacques Derrida for instance 
regards play as the cornerstone for any culture.9 Derrida’s interpretation of 
play as a cultural root also enjoys an ancient and distinguished history. To 
quote from the entry in the Encyclopédie for ‘Game of Roman children (Ro-
man history)’: 
One of their most usual games was representation of a day at court, under all 
its aspects, which they named judicia ludere. There were judges, prosecutors, 
attorney, and guards to put in jail a condemned party. Plutarch, in his life of 
Cato from Utica, tells about one of these children who, after the ruling was led 
by a boy older than he was, took him to a small room and locked him up. The 
child was scared and called for Cato (also a participant in this game) to help 
him. Cato made his way through their playmates, freed his client, and brought 
him back to his place […].   Playing with Molecular Models  87 
Thus, Derrida’s is quite a respectable viewpoint. Nevertheless, for the pur-
pose of this paper the discussion will be set in the traditional rationalist inter-
pretation. 
  Another feature yet ought to be mentioned in this section devoted to a 
reminder of the most relevant factors, for our purpose, in play and games. 
This is game as the attempted prediction of a random outcome. We can best 
illustrate this aspect with the Brazilian illegal lottery, jogo do bicho, originated 
in Rio de Janeiro. This occurred in the distant past, about a century ago: at 
irregular intervals, animals from the zoo were taken out for a stroll through 
the Rio streets. Soon, the Cariocas (inhabitants of Rio) started betting on 
which animals would show up. Thus, the jogo do bicho, a form of gambling, 
had been invented. It endures to this day. There is a total of 24 emblematic 
animals. The results of the daily draw are posted in every bar. Brazilians are 
very fond of their game, both on account of it being illegal (most people, 
worldwide, when playing games, such as cowboys and Indians, prefer the side 
of the outlaws to that of the law enforcers, the cops) and for the connection 
it enables them to draw between their dream life and reality (one of them 
might say: “I dreamt of hearing mocking sounds in the forest, hence I’ll wa-
ger on the monkey.”). As Émile Borel has reminded us most convincingly,10 
all such money games are structurally biased in favor of the organizer; and 
the probability laws ensure that the bank in a casino, the government coffers 
in a lottery, or the Swiss accounts for a local Mafia (jogo do bicho or others) 
are inevitably the winners, by a hefty margin. 
3. Miniatures as toys 
Allow me to single out, among toys crafted or manufactured for children,11 
the following short list: dolls and doll houses;12 toy soldiers; model trains; 
remote controlled vehicles (cars, airplanes); miniature cars; kites; construc-
tion  sets  (Erector,  Lego,  Meccano,  etc.);  parlor  games  such  as  Monopoly. 
Those all offer (and offer themselves as) a representation, as a parallel world 
in reduction (or microcosm), as a stereotyped object which the child can ma-
nipulate at whim and totally control. 
  Equally interesting, one can reflect on toys and games whose use straddles 
the borderline between childhood and adulthood. Monopoly belongs to this 
category. Let me give another few examples. Adult men, especially in Great 
Britain and Germany, collect model trains, and there are specialized shops in 
these countries catering for such railway buffs. A symbolical transposition of 
a battlefield is the chessboard (Vladimir Nabokov makes somewhere the il-
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they were enslaved for so many centuries). Puppet shows – often with a sub-
versive social and political function, often with a popular origin at the mar-
gins of society (but this would be an altogether separate story) – bridge the 
gap between role-playing by children at home and role-playing by adult ac-
tors in the theater. 
  All such toys stand for a complex reality which they evoke, which they 
allow to escape from, to conjure at the obvious cost of drastic oversimplifica-
tion. Also, it is no accident that quite a few items in the above list came into 
fashion in the aftermath to World War I and its bloodbath: Ole Kirk Christi-
ansen started LEGO sets in 1934;13 Meccano production started in 1914; the 
Monopoly game appeared during and as a result of the Depression. Could all 
such games belong to an escapist episteme in the sense of Foucault, brought 
about by the mass slaughters14 of the First World War?  
  Thus model houses, model cars, model airplanes, model people as repre-
sented  by  dolls  and  puppets,  serve  dual and complementary functions for 
children and for adults. They prepare the former to the real world, through 
establishing first familiarity with the world of toys. They allow the latter an 
escape, regression perhaps also, from the real world into the Lilliputian world 
of toys. In some rare cases too, an adult will behave as the child he was not 
allowed to be, because of e.g. recovery of a long-lost mode of perception.15 
  At this point, an obvious objection springs up: molecular models are not 
miniatures, they are macrotures – to use an ugly neologism – they are en-
largements by many orders of magnitude over the postulated (by a form of 
naive realism) molecular ‘objects’. The answer is equally obvious. Molecular 
models and miniature toys share their being representations of entities in the 
real world, with the attendant change in scale, also with stereotyping and se-
vere simplifications (such as the freezing-out of time and motion in molecu-
lar models for handling). Those representations, by contrast to virtual reality, 
are  also  real  objects,  made  of  wood,  plastic,  metal,  etc.  They  are  quasi-
oxymoronic illusions which one can see, touch, scratch, lick, sniff, etc. Their 
user can handle and control them at will. Such illusions belong to dummies, 
by contrast to mere mental images and illusions. 
4. Make-believe as play 
An essential dimension of play originates in a bodily gesture. The player, be 
he or she an infant, a child, or an adult, first shows a certain intention and 
then acts different from what onlookers or other players had been led to ex-
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arts (such as judo, jiu-jitsu, aikido, boxe française, etc.), in boxing, fencing, 
American football, soccer, etc. 
  The underlying mental attitude is pretending: a general might say to him-
self or to his subordinates “I am pretending to move to the Northwest, in or-
der for the enemy to follow suit with his forces; then, when I have attracted 
him into this particular trap, I’ll try to annihilate his forces.” Children often 
engage in pretend games: they play being parents, or a pilot, a train engineer, 
a car driver etc. As just mentioned, war games in a military college belong to 
the same class, military exercises in the field likewise. Quite a few sexual fan-
tasies, whether acted-out or not, also belong to the same category of pretend-
ing games. Traditionally, adults indulge in pretending games at festive times, 
often set at a particular time in the calendar such as Carnival, when the wear-
ing of costumes and masks is an outward representation of the role-playing.  
  Adults also engage in pretend games – truly mixes of play and work, the 
game has become to a large extent a tool, i.e. an adjunct with a purpose – 
when carrying out computer simulations, for instance of the Monte Carlo 
type;16 or as when professionals, pilots for instance, use flight simulators.17 
Molecular models are thus hybrids, in-between tools and games. By handling 
them, the chemist acts out a set of beliefs, both individual and corporate, re-
garding entities in the microphysical world.  
  This is a game, since those entities are as elusive and inaccessible to our 
perception as angels or ghosts, even with the help of the most modern scien-
tific instruments. This is a serious activity, in that these molecular models 
have a postulated resemblance to reality, enough as to give them operational 
value. 
5. Models as transitional objects 
The psychoanalyst Donald Woods Winnicott (1896-1971) is famous, among 
other influential contributions,18 for his concept of the ‘transitional object’.19 
A transitional object (TO), according to Winnicott, has the following attrib-
utes: 1. it is a material object; 2. the TO serves as a go-between the infant (at 
the age of four to twelve months20) and the world; 3. the child makes the TO 
an extension of himself/herself; 4. the child indeed appropriates the TO; 5. 
the TO is polysemic; 6. the TO is handled obsessively; 7. the TO is often soft 
and cuddly; 8. the TO has the function of loosening the ties to the mother 
and of helping the child gain his or her autonomy; 9. the TO occupies an ar-
ea, mental and spatial, in-between the psyche and the physical environment, 
which helps the individual to acquire a symbolizing activity and prowess. 90  Pierre Laszlo 
  An example of a TO is Linus’s security blanket which he carries around in 
the Peanuts comic strip while sucking on his thumb, a behavior emulated by 
an estimated 60% children in Western culture. Later, adults play with items 
reminiscent of TO’s. Textual narratives and movies, in particular, make great 
use of visual allusions to such infantile relics: Sherlock Holmes’s fidgeting 
with his pipe; Citizen Kane’s Rosebud sled; or Steve McQueen’s tennis ball 
in The Great Escape are such ploys. We have all seen adults fiddling likewise 
with a cigarette, a lighter, a matchbox, a telephone cord, etc. and we know 
how widespread such a behavior can be.  
  One may note, in this context, that chemists quite often adopt a formula, 
that of the molecule they are most concerned with, as their signature-cum-
fetish: for instance, when hosted by a fellow chemist, by occasion of a semi-
nar especially, often a request is presented to sign a guestbook. Besides the 
usual  statements  acknowledging  the  quality  of  the  hospitality,  the  guest 
writes down his or her name and often accompanies it with a chemical formu-
la. I regard such a habit as coterminous to the use of formulas as icons, first 
within the chemical community and then in the culture at large. Examples of 
the first kind are camphor, the steroid skeleton, and the porphyrin ring. Ex-
amples of the second kind are the benzene ring and the DNA double helix. 
  Concerning  molecular  models,  Winnicott’s  profound  insight  translates 
and helps recognizing the interconnection between at least three levels: the 
self, the outside world or rather worlds (both macroscopic and microscopic) 
and this hybrid, intermediate object, the molecular model, which serves as a 
kind of a stick to mentally probe the physical world with. Thus, the molecu-
lar model has the eminent function of a toy: among other features, it points 
to  an  infantile  regression  under  the  cloak  or  umbrella  of  advancement  of 
knowledge.  
6. The epistemic dimension of play 
Very early, construction kits were used in a school setting to kindle the inter-
est of children in following their building instinct. When Fröbel devised the 
kindergarten,21 such auxiliaries were an integral part of his program, viz. to 
make  the  child  learn  alone  how  to  master  an  environment  in  miniature,22 
formed from wooden building blocks.23 Indeed, Christoph Meinel has put 
forward the attractive (but so far totally unproven and unsupported) hypoth-
esis of a link between the Fröbelian kindergarten and the devising by profes-
sional chemists (Kekulé, Couper, Crum Brown, Havrez and a few others) of 
chemical formulas and models in the heyday of structural chemistry during 
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of the kindergarten, she was moved also by an optimistic trust in the intellec-
tual abilities of very young children, for mathematics in particular,26 and she 
devised her own set of wooden blocks and artifacts to help children acquire 
essential cognitive skills.27 It remained for Jean Piaget to propose in the 1950s 
a genetic epistemology, relating sensorimotor development of the child and 
the gradual acquisition of cognitive skills.28 Piaget has also related history of 
science to psychogenesis.29 
  Kits such as the Montessori set help to develop several distinct and com-
plementary abilities, viz. recognition of shapes, textures and colors; assembly 
of modules into structures; the creativity of construction, able to not only 
reproduce already existing schemes but also to invent new ones; the notion of 
an overall shape distinct from the elementary shapes of individual modules; 
the construction-destruction duality (a child often takes considerable satis-
faction in wrecking a carefully built contraption); the dual notion of stability-
instability (a child learns how to build either a durable or a self-collapsing 
vertical accumulation of elements); and, related to the already mentioned de-
structive inclination, the experiencing of deformation i.e. acquiring a notion 
of how a given assembly can be modified and perturbed so that it will assume 
somewhat differing shapes. 
  Let us note, in particular, the realm of pleasurable feelings associated with 
touch and with the handling of things. The interplay between visual and tac-
tile elements is a major component in cognition – all the more so for it being 
associated with sensuous and even, at times, erotic emotions. 
  What are the connections between a young child playfully learning the 
feeling and appearances of objects, on one hand, and a research scientist han-
dling a molecular model (let us assume, for the sake of the argument and even 
though they are now fast disappearing, this is a concrete wood or plastic arti-
fact)? Is there, as implied by Meinel’s lovely hypothesis, another connection 
as well between innovative preschool or primary school teaching and innova-
tive thinking on the part of a trained scientist? 
  I  see  three  main  enduring  attitudes  possibly  fostered  in  childhood  by 
playing with Fröbelian or Montessori sets of blocks. The first is autonomy: 
Maria  Montessori  wanted  to  endow  each  child  with  self-esteem  and  with 
enough self-assurance to carry him or her throughout life. It is not necessary 
to stress the importance of a critical and autonomous stance to the work by 
any  scientist.  The  second  is  the  carrying  out  deformations  of  the  model, 
whether actually or in the mind. Children love deformation of one’s face, as 
in grinning, grimacing or from deforming mirrors. Kindergarten self-teaching 
from a set of modular objects leads to alterations of constructs, as we saw. It 
would be an asset to any scientist to study, to foresee, and to plan organized 
deformations, topological for instance, of three-dimensional objects. An out-
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the possible link between two atomic centers formally distant, at least in a 
two-dimensional representation.30 
  The third potential legacy from an initiation into play with construction 
kits during kindergarten is in ‘what if?’ questions posed by scientists. At a 
certain age, toddlers love the showing and hiding, in quick succession, of an 
object, of a face or of a person. The educated, mature counterpart of such 
hide-and-show games is when a research scientist, behaving as an engineer 
and treating a system of study as a black box, says to him/herself: “what 
would happen if I remove this particular part? Or that other part?” Manipula-
tion of a molecular model, especially in a playful manner, makes it easy to 
raise such questions – which of course is at least as important as figuring out 
how to answer them. 
  Such epistemic consequences of playing with games and models include 
discoveries.31 Sports such as basketball or rugby were not born otherwise. 
Galileo watching during a church service, as the story goes, the pendular mo-
tion of chandeliers discovered their law of motion. Pauling, while in bed in 
Oxford  with  the  flu  according  to  witnesses  such  as  Dorothy  Crowfoot 
Hodgkin, played with paper models and discovered the alpha helix compo-
nent of protein structure. His study of models, with which he surrounded 
himself during his whole life at work and at home,32 led him to other discov-
eries such as the structure of rare gas hydrates.33 Likewise, Harold Kroto as-
sociates his part in the discovery of C60 (also known as ‘buckyball’) to a soc-
cer ball reminiscence. 
  Lewis Carroll can be singled out in the Victorian era for his reinjecting 
into literature for children the playful fun a professional scientist enjoys.34 
His writings relegate the original scientific concepts in the background; for 
instance, Through the Looking Glass arguably has to do with enantiomers and 
racemization, i.e. with the work of Louis Pasteur. In the 20
th century, George 
Gamow at first,35 Richard P. Feynman later on36 displayed a kindred spirit of 
witty and funny science popularization. 
7. Costly toys? 
Like most assertions, the main thesis in this paper – chemists are wont to play 
with molecular models – is subject to criticism and refutation. Two of the 
main objections, not unrelated, are “what about the cost?” and ”this is also a 
pedagogical tool and thus it is obviously not a toy.” 
  Let us consider each in turn. True, molecular models at their most accu-
rate are precision-engineered37 and they can thus be extremely costly. This 
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Dreiding models were likewise very expensive. Regarding the latter, exquisite 
samples of Swiss craftsmanship, I can recall – if I may be allowed this person-
al note – visiting Professor E.J. Corey in his Harvard office in early 1963. 
Above his desk, near the ceiling he had strung a line on which a whole collec-
tion of Dreiding models was hanging. There were perhaps two or three doz-
ens of those. They represented the structures of the complex natural prod-
ucts in the process of synthesis in his laboratory. I remember most vividly my 
shock at ogling several thousands of dollars hanging in the air. Immobiliza-
tion of that sort, while rather convenient, was most expensive: a status sym-
bol, perhaps? 
  The answer to this first objection is that indeed some toys, whether for 
children (an electric train) or for adults (a Porsche or a Jaguar) are indeed 
outrageously costly. In spite of their price tag, they do contribute neverthe-
less their bit to the self-esteem of their lucky owner. 
  We come to the second objection by noting that much cheaper (much less 
accurate too) sets are offered to students of chemistry: which relates to the 
topics of classroom and homework use of molecular models. The chemistry 
instructor is wont to complement the pictures of molecules he or she shows 
(movies,  videos,  computer  output,  slides,  transparencies,  etc.)  or  draws 
(blackboard,  overhead  projector)  by  building their models in front of the 
students. He or she can display in this manner an overall shape and significant 
features such as the relative rigidity of a cyclohexane ring in the chair con-
formation as contrasted to the flexibility of the twist boat form; or the inver-
sion  of  R/S  configuration  attendant  upon  a  Walden  inversion;  or  yet  the 
pseudorotation in a trigonal bipyramid, for say a pentacoordinated phospho-
rus atom. 
  Whereas the students follow attentively such classroom demonstrations, 
teachers often complain that the students’ study of the subject matter does 
not include quite enough model building and observation, as if students had 
trouble switching from a passive to an active role. Why? Sometimes, the cost 
of models, even though it remains marginal, may be an issue. Another often-
quoted  reason  is  that  many  students  have  trouble  visualizing  three-
dimensional  geometric  shapes,  through  lack  of  habit  predominantly.  They 
shy away from gaining familiarity through use of models, precisely when this 
would be a great help to them: try to understand! Yet another reason is the 
perception by students of the playful, open-ended manipulation of models. 
This creative feature, which allows for build-up of all sorts of structures, runs 
afoul  of  the  implicit  teacher-student  contract  which  specifies  and  circum-
scribes the exact subject matter to be learned, memorized and regurgitated at 
examination time. 
  Recently, historians of science have often commented about the didactic 
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chemical formulas and three-dimensional models. This is a worthwhile obser-
vation. However, regarding models, the ‘show-and-tell’ dimension remains 
secondary, at least to this practitioner, to the inspection of models in the 
half-serious, half-playful mode of the scientist tinkering with such a toy in 
his/her search for a significant problem to address and solve. We close up 
now with consideration of this all-important mute dialog between the scien-
tist and the model. 
8. Homo chimicus ludens 
The chemist looks at his model. Notice how this last sentence parallels this 
other sentence: the artist looks at his model. There are similarities and differ-
ences. Similarities include the intensity of the look, the confrontation be-
tween the viewing and the imagining, i.e. between the object sitting out there 
being looked at and an image in the mind. There is a more distant analogy 
too: the chemical model, just like a work of art made after a model, can be 
unfinished and be still in a somewhat inchoate state. A difference is that, 
while often a model for a painting or a sculpture is a real person or an animate 
part of nature, the model the chemist views and ponders is an inanimate as-
sembly.  
  Another analogy springs to mind. The chemist observes his (or her) mod-
el in like manner as Daedalus inspecting a daidalon, a device of his design and 
make. This is the attitude analogous to that of an architect inspecting a minia-
ture model of a construction, or likewise of an engineer examining a dummy 
reproduction of a bridge, a ship or an aircraft. 
  The chemist studies the model with full awareness of the two complemen-
tary  modes  of  perception,  touch  and  sight.  The  molecular  model  bridges 
them, and this is an essential feature. The scientist handles the model, feels 
his way around it, thus anthrophormizing it. He or she scrutinizes the model, 
looks at the relationships between the parts. A phrase such as ‘non-bonded 
interactions’  is  unthinkable  outside  of  the  practice  of  model  building  and 
model viewing. The scientist pays special, careful attention to potential com-
plementarities of shapes, since he/she knows how important such congruenc-
es of the lock-and-key type (Emil Fischer)39 are inter alia to biological activi-
ty. Homo chimicus thus links across the ages with Homo sapiens (or Homo 
sapiens sapiens) when in the Neolithic (if not earlier) tools were being careful-
ly manufactured: scrapers, arrowheads, etc. 
  To sum up: to the professional chemist, molecular models are as much 
toys as they are tools.40   Playing with Molecular Models  95 
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